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I. ST ATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
By this lawsuit, Mickelsen Construction, Inc. (herein "Mickelsen") attempted to 
collect on an alleged guaranty agreement in the amount of $34,980. (R at 2). To do so, it 
has brought this suit against Lesa D. Horrocks (herein "Horrocks") and Sunshine 
Secretarial Services, Inc. (herein "Sunshine") as guarantors of the debt owed to 
Mickelsen Construction by Alan Smith (herein "Smith") and Accelerated Paving, Inc. 
(herein "Accelerated.") 
1. Standard on appeal. 
In an appeal from an order of summary judgment, this Court's standard of review 
is the same as the standard used by the district court in ruling on a motion for summary 
judgment. Farm Credit Bank of Spokane v. Stevenson, 125 Idaho 270, 272, 869 P.2d 
1365, 1367 (1994). Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, affidavits, and 
discovery documents on file with the court, read in a light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party, demonstrate no material issue of fact such that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Thomson v. City of Lewiston, 137 Idaho 473, 
476,50 P.3d 488,491 (2002), citing LR.C.P. 56(c) (emphasis added). 
The burden of proving the absence of material facts is upon the moving party. Id., 
citing Petricevich v. Salmon River Canal Co., 92 Idaho 865, 452 P.2d 362 (1969). 
However, the adverse party may not "rest upon the mere allegations of denials of his 
pleadings, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set 
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." LR.C.P. 56(e). The 
moving party is entitled to judgment when the nonmoving party fails to make a showing 
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sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case on which 
that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Thomson, 137 Idaho at 476, 50 PJd at 
491. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION 
Mickelsen filed suit on June 30, 2010, under the theory of a guaranty agreement 
among Horrocks/Sunshine, Smith/Accelerated and Mickelsen. (R at 1-4). Horrocks and 
Sunshine answered on July 22, 2010. (R at 8). Horrocks and Sunshine thereafter moved 
for summary judgment on October 29, 2010. (R at 20-21). On February 2, 2011, the 
District Court granted summary judgment to Respondents. (R at 59). 
Judgment in favor of Horrocks and Sunshine were entered dismissing the suit and 
granting their attorney fees on February 2,2011 and May 11, 2011, respectively. (R at 74, 
90). Mickelsen filed for appeal on March 7, 2011. (R at 82). 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
For purposes of summary judgment, it may be assumed that Horrocks made an 
oral agreement to guarantee the credit card payment of Smith and Accelerated prior to 
writing a check on the account of Sunshine and Horrocks in the amount of $34,980.00, 
although Horrocks denies that she agreed to guarantee the debt of Smith and Accelerated. 
(R at 64, Memorandum Decision and Order at 6, fn.7; R at 24). Horrocks involved 
herself and Sunshine for no reason other than to help facilitate the transaction, and neither 
Horrocks nor Sunshine received any financial benefit for their role in the transaction. (R 
at 24, Ll. 16, 17; R at 63). 
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II. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
Respondents Lesa Horrocks and Sunshine Secretarial Services, Inc. request 
attorney fees on appeal on the bases of Idaho Appellate Rule 41 and IDAHO CODE § 12-
120(3). The underlying action is a "civil action to recover on a ... guaranty ... relating 
to the purchase or sale of goods, wares, merchandise, or service," and has, as its basis, a 
"commercial transaction." IDAHO CODE § 12-120(3). As such, should Respondents 
prevail on appeal, they shall be allowed a reasonable attorney's fee to be set by the court, 
to be taxed and collected as costs. Appellant argues for the first time on appeal the issue 
of a negotiable instrument. However, inasmuch as this issue comprises part of the 
Court's decision, Idaho Code § 12-120(3) also provides for mandatory attorney's fees for 
civil actions "to recover on ... [a] negotiable instrument." 
The party prevailing on appeal is entitled to an award of a reasonable attorney fee 
under Idaho Code § 12-120(3). Taylor v. Just, 138 Idaho 137, 142, 59 P.3d 308, 313 
(2002). 
III. ARGUMENT 
A. THE CHECK WAS NOT A SUFFICIENT WRITING UNDER I.e. § 9-505(2) 
Mickelsen, in its Complaint, set forth a cause of action for collecting under a 
guaranty agreement. (R at 1-3). As such, it is necessary to determine whether or not an 
enforceable guaranty agreement existed. 
For purposes of its opinion, the District Court accepted as true that Horrocks 
orally agreed to guarantee the Accelerated debt. (R at 64, fn. 7). Even after granting aU 
reasonable inferences to Mickelsen, the District Court still granted summary judgment 
against Mickelsen on the basis of a simple question of law: was the check delivered to 
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Mickelsen a sufficient writing so as to remove the purported guaranty agreement from the 
Statute of Frauds (I.C. 9-505(2)? (R at 68). After thorough analysis of Idaho statute and 
case law and secondary sources, the court concluded that "the check alone fails to show a 
meeting of the minds or show that the parties shared a mutual intent" and, on such basis, 
that the "check lacks essential elements of a guarantee contract." (R at 71-72). 
To be clear, in Idaho, I.C. 9-505 is strictly construed. Kerr v. Finch, 25 Idaho 32, 
135 P. 1165 (1913); Kratzer v. Day, 12 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1926). Without attempting to 
replicate the District Court's well-reasoned analysis of pertinent case law in Idaho, 
Respondents would like to point to Mickelsen's reliance on the Restatement 2d of 
Contracts and, in particular, comment 17 to § 131, in support of its argument that the 
check was, standing alone, a sufficient writing under I.c. § 9-505(2). Whereas Mickelsen 
emphasizes the comment's similarity to the instant case, it fails to address the comment 
directly below it, which is a more specific and pertinent example for this case: 
A agrees not to sue B Company on a debt for goods sold 
and delivered, in consideration of C's guaranty of payment 
for past and future deliveries to B up to $3,000. C signs the 
following guaranty: "I, C, do hereby guarantee to A the 
payment of any sums due or that may become due up to the 
sum of $3,000 on such goods as B may have bought or 
shall buy from A. [Signed] c." A makes no further 
deliveries. The memorandum is not sufficient to charge C, 
since it omits any mention of A's return promise. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 131 cmt. 18 (1981). Comment 18 is an 
example of a would-be guaranty writing that fails to satisfy the Statute of Frauds because 
it "omits any mention of A's return promise."!d. Like in comment 18, in the instant case 
the check delivered to Mickelsen failed to mention Mickelsen's return promise, if any 
existed. 
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Furthermore, Mickelsen fails to address the District Court's quotation of 
American Jurisprudence Guaranty, which states: 
For an instrument to be enforceable as a guaranty, it must 
show, with reasonable clarity, an intent to be liable on an 
obligation in case of default by the primary obligor, and the 
agreement must contain the express conditions of that 
liability and the obligations of each party within the four 
comers of the document. That undertaking must be clear 
and explicit. 
(R at 66, fn. 9, quoting 38 AM. JUR. 2D Guaranty § 5). To be enforceable as a guaranty, 
and become a sufficient writing for purposes of I.C. § 9-505(2), the check here would 
have to show an intent by Horrocks and/or Sunshine to be liable in case of a default by 
Smith! Accelerated, and the check would have to contain the express conditions of 
liability and the obligations of each party, having a clear and explicit undertaking. The 
check itself bears no indication as to the liability and obligations of Accelerated and 
Smith, nor does it contain any indication of Accelerated's or Smith's assent to a guaranty 
agreement. (R at 5). The elements set forth for a sufficient writing under the 
Restatement, American Jurisprudence or case law of the State of Idaho are simply not 
met by the check. 
As the District Court concluded, the check here lacks the essential elements of a 
contract, as it fails to "set forth the parties to the contract, the subject matter thereof, the 
price or consideration, ... and all the essential terms and conditions of the agreement." 
(R at 72); Hoffman v. Sv. Co., Inc., 102 Idaho 187, 190, 628 P.2d 218, 221 (1981). 
Inasmuch as the check fails to set forth the essential terms and conditions of any 
agreement that could be construed as a guaranty, it is not a sufficient writing under I.C. § 
9-505(2) to take itself out of the Statute of Frauds. 
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B. NO ORIGINAL OBLIGATION WAS MADE (I.e. § 9-505) 
Mickelsen argues that Honocks' s "obligation" to pay Mickelsen became an 
original obligation under LC. § 9-506, taking the check exchanged out of the coverage of 
the Statute of Frauds as located in LC. § 9-505(2). 
The District Court, in concluding that Honocks' s promise to guarantee the 
Accelerated debt did not create an original obligation for purposes of satisfying the 
Statute of Frauds, considered and analyzed pertinent statute (LC. § 9-506), case law and 
the "main purpose" rule. (R at 64-68). Mickelsen feels the District Court relied too 
heavily on the "main purpose" rule, stating that it "enoneously concluded that the only 
exception was the 'main purpose' rule and failed to independently evaluate the 
exceptions found in LC. § 9-506." Appellant's Brief at 8. 
The District Court reviewed pertinent case law interpreting the exceptions found 
m I.C. § 9-506, including decisions and interpretations by this Court, which 
interpretations are binding on the District Courts. For one, the District Court analyzed 
Reed v. Samuels, 43 Idaho 55, 249 P. 893 (1926), in which the Supreme Court of Idaho 
considered an action to recover money damages. Reed alleged that Samuels, a corporate 
stockholder, promised to pay to Reed the debt of the third party corporation in exchange 
for Reed's agreeing to "remit ... accrued interest due on [a sum of] $9,000" and to 
reduce his claim from $10,000 to $8,000. !d. at 893. Reed filled the role of Mickelsen in 
this case (as creditor), with Samuels filling in for HonockslSunshine (as promisor) and 
the corporation representing Accelerated (as debtor). 
In Reed this Court considered C.S. § 7977(2), which is a verbatim predecessor of 
LC. § 9-506(2), and looked to foreign case law for guidance on interpretation of the 
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statute, citing a Washington State court for the proposition that "[a]ny promise to pay the 
debt of a third party, whether or not in writing, must be founded upon a consideration in 
order to be binding." Id. at 895, citing McKenzie v. Puget Sound Nat. Bank, 9 Wash. 442, 
37 P. 668 (1894) (emphasis added). The Court further quoted Massachusetts case law for 
clarification: 
It is no sufficient ground to prevent the operation of the 
statute of frauds that the plaintiff has relinquished an 
advantage; or given up a lien, in consequence of the 
defendant's promise, if that advantage has not also directl y 
inured to the benefit of the defendant, so as in effect to 
make it a purchase by the defendant of the plaintiff. 
Reed, 249 P. at 895, quoting Curtis v. Brown, 59 Mass. 488, 491 (1850). Having 
thoroughly explored pertinent case law, the Supreme Court of Idaho held the no original 
obligation arose, and reasoned that 
[u]nder the provisions of [I.e. § 9-506(2)], the creditor 
must part with value under circumstances such as to make 
the party making the promise the principal debtor and the 
person in whose behalf it was made his surety .... If they 
parted with value, it was to the company. It inured to the 
company's benefit and to [Samuels] indirectly as a 
stockholder. There was no consideration moving to 
[Samuels] individually from appellants upon which to base 
an obligation or make him the principal debtor." 
Reed, 249 P. at 895 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court interpreted C.S. § 
7977(2) (now I.e. § 9-506(2» to require that consideration must flow to a promisor 
(Horrocks/Sunshine) before any finding that an original obligation is formed under 
subdivision 2. This conclusion is further bolstered by the Court's finding that the correct 
rule of law applicable to the facts was 27 Corpus Juris 147 (1922), which required "new 
consideration moving to the promisor and beneficial to him" to form an original 
obligation. [d. 
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The Supreme Court of Idaho having interpreted the applicable statute, I.C. § 9-
506(2) in 1926, and the Idaho legislature not having changed the formulation of that 
section to the present day, the District Court below was bound to adhere to judicial 
interpretation from this jurisdiction's highest court. Furthermore, although Reed did not 
specifically address I.C. § 9-506 (1)&(3), the holding therein applies across the boards to 
all possible exceptions to the Statute of Frauds on the basis of an "original obligation." 
"The promise to pay [is] original when it is founded on a new consideration moving to 
the promisor and beneficial to him. . . . The rule in this form has met with practicall y 
universal acceptance." Id., quoting 27 Corpus Juris 147 (1922). There was no new 
consideration moving to Horrocks/Sunshine, and therefore there is no original obligation. 
Even so, it is clear from a cursory reading of the statute itself that I.C. § 9-506 
(1)&(3) do not apply to make an original obligation in this case. Subsection (1) requires 
that the promisor (Horrocks/Sunshine) has either (A) received property of another, or (B) 
received a discharge from an obligation, in consideration of their promise. IDAHO CODE § 
9-506(1). It is undisputed that Horrocks/Sunshine did not receive either property of 
another or a discharge from an obligation, and Mickelsen seems to acknowledge such. 
See Appellant's Brief at 12, fn. 5. 
Subsection (3) requires that the party receiving the promise, Mickelsen, either (A) 
cancel the antecedent obligation, accepting the new promise as a substitute for the 
antecedent obligation, (B) release the property of another from a levy, or (C) provide 
consideration beneficial to the promisor (Horrocks/Sunshine). IDAHO CODE § 9-506(3). 
Again, it is undisputed that Mickelsen did not cancel the obligation of Accelerated or 
release any of Accelerated's property from levy, and that Horrocks/Sunshine received no 
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beneficial consideration. Mickelsen again seems to acknowledge such. See Appellant's 
Briefat 12, fn. 5. 
Mickelsen attempts to argue that consideration existed VIa the "business 
relationship" between Sunshine and Accelerated. (R at 68, fn.1O); see Appellant's Brie/at 
5. At oral argument, Mickelsen noted that the "benefit to Horrocks was helping a party 
she had a business relationship with, as Horrocks affidavit shows that Accelerated 
subleased property occupied by Horrocks and paid rent for that sublease."(R at 68, fn.10). 
However, the District Court quickly found that there was no evidence to suggest that 
Horrocks agreed to guarantee the debt because of that relationship. !d. 
There was no affidavit, pleading or discovery document on file with the Court on 
which basis the Court could make a determination, or even an inference, that 
consideration existed. There is not a scintilla of evidence to support the inference other 
than haphazard insinuations regarding Horrocks's and Accelerated's tenant -subtenant 
relationship. There being no proof that Horrocks and Accelerated were in combination, 
Mickelsen should have requested more time to conduct discovery-but it did not. As a 
result, the Court must make determinations as to summary judgment on the "pleadings, 
affidavits, and discovery documents on file with the court." Thomson v. City of Lewiston, 
137 Idaho 473, 476, 50 P.3d 488,491 (2002), citing I.R.c.P. 56(c). 
With none of the three pertinent subsections of I.c. § 9-506 providing an original 
obligation exception from the Statute of Frauds, the guaranty agreement is within the 
Statute of Frauds and is thus barred, there not being a suffiCient writing under I.C. § 9-
505. 
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C. THE CHECK IS NOT ENFORCEABLE IRRESPECTIVE OF WHETHER 
IT IS SIJFFICIENT AS AN ORIGINAL OBLIGATION OR GUARANTY 
For the very first time on appeal, Mickelsen attempts to argue new theories of 
liability in support of the proposition that the check here is enforceable regardless of 
whether it is sufficient as an original obligation or as a guaranty. All such arguments and 
theories of liability, including that the check is independently enforceable as a negotiable 
instrument, are new theories and arguments presented on appeal. This Coun disallows 
such belated arguments: appellate court review is "limited to the evidence, theories, and 
arguments that were presented below." Woods v. Sanders, 150 Idaho 53, 244 P.3d 197, 
202 (2010), citing Obenchain v. McAlvain Constr., Inc., 143 Idaho 56, 137 P.3d 443,444 
(2006). 
Not even in its Complaint does Mickelsen put Horrocks and Sunshine on notice of 
any claim related to independent enforcement as a negotiable instrument or contract. 
"[I]ssues considered on summary judgment are those raised by the pleadings." Gardner v. 
Evans, 110 Idaho 925, 939, 719 P.2d 1185, 1199 (1986), quoting Argyle v. Slemaker, 107 
Idaho 668, 669, 691 P.2d 1283, 1284 (Ct.App.1984). In his Complaint, Mickelsen failed 
to assert any elements of a contractual claim or any statutory authority for enforcing a 
negotiable instrument. (R at 1-3). Instead, Mickelsen asserted that the check was written 
as a guaranty. (R at 2, <]I VII). Now that Mickelsen realizes that its guaranty arguments 
fail to overcome the Statute of Frauds, it attempts to "speak out of both sides of its 
mouth" by claiming a cause of action on a guaranty agreement, while simultaneously 
claiming independent enforcement as a negotiable instrument. It wants to assert for the 
first time on appeal to the Supreme Court that the obligation is independent as a 
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negotiable instrument and somehow cull a related claim out of its Complaint, which was 
filed on June 30, 20lO-over a year ago. This line of argument and new cause of action 
should be barred, as it fails to satisfy even the lenient notice pleading provisions of 
LR.C.P. 8(a) and the above-quoted case law prohibiting new arguments presented for the 
first time on appeal. 
Even assuming, arguendo, that the Court were to allow Mickelsen to assert these 
claims, arguments and causes of action for the first time on appeal, the analysis in Reed v. 
Samuels remains pertinent, as Horrocks's and Sunshine's check cannot be considered an 
independent and original obligation, but rather was a gratuitous facilitation of a failed 
transaction. 43 Idaho 55, 249 P. 893 (1926). As stated above, the Court in Reed reasoned 
that no original obligation arose without "consideration moving to [a promisor] 
individually from [creditor] upon which to base an obligation or make him the principal 
debtor." Id. at 895. Here, there was and is no consideration that has moved to Horrocks 
or Sunshine as "promisors," and thus no independent or original obligation has arisen. 
To hold otherwise would be to completely eviscerate the Statute of Frauds, 
holding on one hand that the guaranty is barred for lack of a sufficient writing, while 
holding on the other hand that the way around the guaranty issue is by simply suing on 
the negotiable instrument at the heart of the transaction, which instrument itself did not 
suffice as a writing to move the transaction out of the Statute of Frauds. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Based on the record and pleadings filed in this case, Appellant has not produced 
facts that demonstrate material disputes of fact. Even construing all disputed facts in 
Appellant's favor, the law, including the Statute of Frauds, prevents Appellant from 
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prevailing and thus, as a matter of law, the District Court's order granting summary 
judgment to Respol)dent should be affirmed. 
f I) 
/) :";i~-
DATED this 0\ (j day of September, 2011. 
MAY, RAMMELL & THOMPSON, CHID: 
AttorneY~fgr-Reyp~fl4f7nts 
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